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Abstract—As the most successful cryptocurrency to date,
Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many
attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector
has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet
routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing
advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic,
Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large
fraction of Bitcoin traffic.
This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and
their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks,
targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the
network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key
properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of
routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of
Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that
any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to
isolate ∼50% of the mining power—even when considering that
mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path
network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation
by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages.
We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the
deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on
the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin
supernode combined with BGP routing data.
The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts
of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause
a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to
revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as
double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide
both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can
be deployed immediately.
I. INTRODUCTION
With more than 16 million bitcoins valued at ∼17 billion
USD and up to 300,000 daily transactions (March 2017),
Bitcoin is the most successful cryptocurrency to date. Re-
markably, Bitcoin has achieved this as an open and fully
decentralized system. Instead of relying on a central entity,
Bitcoin nodes build a large overlay network between them
and use consensus to agree on a set of transactions recorded
within Bitcoin’s core data structure: the blockchain. Anyone
is free to participate in the network which boasts more than
6,000 nodes [4] and can usually connect to any other node.
Given the amount of money at stake, Bitcoin is an obvi-
ous target for attackers. Indeed, numerous attacks have been
described targeting different aspects of the system including:
double spending [43], eclipsing [31], transaction malleabil-
ity [21], or attacks targeting mining [24], [44], [38] and mining
pools [23].
One important attack vector has been overlooked though:
attacking Bitcoin via the Internet infrastructure using routing
attacks. As Bitcoin connections are routed over the Internet—
in clear text and without integrity checks—any third-party
on the forwarding path can eavesdrop, drop, modify, inject,
or delay Bitcoin messages such as blocks or transactions.
Detecting such attackers is challenging as it requires infer-
ring the exact forwarding paths taken by the Bitcoin traffic
using measurements (e.g., traceroute) or routing data (BGP
announcements), both of which can be forged [41]. Even
ignoring detectability, mitigating network attacks is also hard
as it is essentially a human-driven process consisting of
filtering, routing around or disconnecting the attacker. As an
illustration, it took Youtube close to 3 hours to locate and
resolve rogue BGP announcements targeting its infrastructure
in 2008 [6]. More recent examples of routing attacks such as
[51] (resp. [52]) took 9 (resp. 2) hours to resolve in November
(resp. June) 2015.
One of the reasons why routing attacks have been over-
looked in Bitcoin is that they are often considered too chal-
lenging to be practical. Indeed, perturbing a vast peer-to-peer
network which uses random flooding is hard as an attacker
would have to intercept many connections to have any impact.
Yet, two key characteristics of the Internet’s infrastructure
make routing attacks against Bitcoin possible: (i) the efficiency
of routing manipulation (BGP hijacks); and (ii) the centraliza-
tion of Bitcoin from the routing perspective. First, individuals,
located anywhere on the Internet, can manipulate routing to
intercept all the connections to not only one, but many Bitcoin
nodes. As we show in this paper, these routing manipulations
are prevalent today and do divert Bitcoin traffic. Second, few
ASes host most of the nodes and mining power, while others
intercept a considerable fraction of the connections.
This work In this paper, we present the first taxonomy of
routing attacks on Bitcoin, a comprehensive study of their
impact, and a list of deployable countermeasures. We consider
two general attacks that AS-level attackers can perform. First,
we evaluate the ability of attackers to isolate a set of nodes
from the Bitcoin network, effectively partitioning it. Second,
we evaluate the impact of delaying block propagation by
manipulating a small number of key Bitcoin messages. For
both exploits, we consider node-level attacks along with more
challenging, but also more disruptive, network-wide attacks.
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Partitioning attacks The goal of a partition attack is to
completely disconnect a set of nodes from the network. This
requires the attacker to divert and cut all the connections
between the set of nodes and the rest of the network.
We describe a complete attack procedure in which an at-
tacker can verifiably isolate a selected set of nodes using BGP
hijacks. Our procedure is practical and only requires basic
knowledge of the Bitcoin topology, namely the IP addresses of
the nodes the attacker wants to isolate. Due to the complexity
of the Bitcoin network (e.g. multi-homed pools, and secret
peering agreements between pools), the initial isolated set
might contain nodes that leak information from and to the rest
of the network. We explain how the attacker can identify and
remove these leakage points until the partition is complete.
Delay attacks The goal of a delay attack is to slow down the
propagation of blocks towards or from a given set of nodes.
Unlike partition attacks, which require a perfect cut, delay
attacks are effective even when a subset of the connections
are intercepted. As such, attackers can perform delay attacks
on connections they are naturally intercepting, making them
even harder to detect.
We again describe a complete attack procedure an attacker
can run on intercepted Bitcoin traffic so that the delivery of
blocks is delayed by up to 20 minutes. The procedure consists
of modifying few key Bitcoin messages while making sure that
the connections are not disrupted.
Practicality We showcase the practicality of each attack and
evaluate their network-wide impact using a comprehensive set
of measurements, simulations and experiments.
Regarding partitioning attacks, we show that hijacks are
effective in diverting Bitcoin traffic by performing a hijack in
the wild against our own nodes. We find that it takes less than
90 seconds to re-route all traffic flows through the attacker
once a hijack is initiated. We also show that any AS in the
Internet hijacking less than 100 prefixes can isolate up to 47%
of the mining power, and this, even when considering that
mining pools are multi-homed. Hijacks involving that many
prefixes are frequent and already divert Bitcoin traffic.
Regarding delay attacks, we show that an attacker inter-
cepting 50% of a node connections can leave it uninformed
of the most recent Bitcoin blocks ∼60% of the time. We also
show that intercepting a considerable percentage of Bitcoin
traffic is practical due to the centralization of Bitcoin at
the routing level: one AS, namely Hurricane Electric, can
naturally intercept more than 30% of all Bitcoin connections.
Impact on Bitcoin The damages caused to Bitcoin in case
of a successful routing attack can be substantial. By isolating
a part of the network or delaying the propagation of blocks,
attackers can force nodes to waste part of their mining power
as some of the blocks they create are discarded. Partitioning
also enables the attacker to filter transactions that clients try to
include in the blockchain. In both cases, miners lose potential
revenue from mining and render the network more susceptible
to double spending attacks as well as to selfish mining
attacks [24]. Nodes representing merchants, exchanges and
other large entities are thus unable to secure their transactions,
or may not be able to broadcast them to the network to begin
with. The resulting longer-term loss of trust in Bitcoin security
may trigger a loss of value for Bitcoin. Attackers may even
short Bitcoin and gain from the resulting devaluation [35].
Our work underscores the importance of proposed modi-
fications which argue for encrypting Bitcoin traffic [47] or
traffic exchanged among miners [34]. Yet, we stress that not all
routing attacks will be solved by such measures since attackers
can still disrupt connectivity and isolate nodes by dropping
Bitcoin packets instead of modifying them.
Contributions Our main contributions are:1
• The first comprehensive study of network attacks on Bitcoin
(Section III) ranging from attacks targeting a single node to
attacks affecting the network as a whole.
• A measurement study of the routing properties of Bitcoin
(Section VI). We show that Bitcoin is highly centralized:
few ASes host most of the nodes while others intercept a
considerable fraction of the connections.
• A thorough evaluation of the practicality of routing attacks
(partitioning and delay attacks). Our evaluation is based on
an extensive set of measurements, large-scale simulations
and experiments on the actual Bitcoin software and network.
• A comprehensive set of countermeasures (Section IX),
which can benefit even early adopters.
While our measurements are Bitcoin-specific, they carry
important lessons for other cryptocurrencies which rely on a
randomly structured peer-to-peer network atop of the Internet,
such as Ethereum [1], Litecoin [9], and ZCash [14], [45].
II. BACKGROUND
A. BGP
Protocol BGP [42] is the de-facto routing protocol that reg-
ulates how IP packets are forwarded in the Internet. Routes
associated with different IP prefixes are exchanged between
neighboring networks or Autonomous Systems (AS). For any
given IP prefix, one AS (the origin) is responsible for the
original route advertisement, which is then propagated AS-
by-AS until all ASes learn about it. Routers then set their
next hop and pick one of the available routes offered by their
neighbors (this is done independently for each destination).
In BGP, the validity of route announcements is not checked.
In effect, this means that any AS can inject forged information
on how to reach one or more IP prefixes, leading other ASes to
send traffic to the wrong location. These rogue advertisements,
known as BGP “hijacks”, are a very effective way for an
attacker to intercept traffic en route to a legitimate destination.
BGP hijack An attacker, who wishes to attract all the traffic
for a legitimate prefix p (say, 100.0.0.0/16) by hijacking could
either: (i) announce p; or (ii) announce a more-specific (longer)
1Our software, measurements and scripts can be found online at
https://btc-hijack.ethz.ch
prefix of p. In the first case, the attacker’s route will be in direct
competition with the legitimate route. As BGP routers prefer
shorter paths, the attacker will, on average, attract 50% of the
traffic [30]. In the second case, the attacker will attract all the
traffic (originated anywhere on the Internet) addressed to the
destination as Internet routers forward traffic according to the
longest-match entry. Note that traffic internal to an AS cannot
be diverted via hijacking as it does not get routed by BGP but
by internal routing protocols (e.g., OSPF).
For instance, in order to attract all traffic destined to p,
the attacker could advertise 100.0.0.0/17 and 100.0.128.0/17.
Routers in the entire Internet would then start forwarding any
traffic destined to the original /16 prefix according to the two
covering /17s originated by the adversary. Advertising more-
specific prefixes has its limits though as BGP operators will
often filter prefixes longer than /24 [33]. Yet, we show that
the vast majority of Bitcoin nodes is hosted in shorter prefixes
(Section VI) and is thus susceptible to hijacking.
By default, hijacking a prefix creates a black hole at the
attacker’s location. However, the attacker can turn a hijack
into an interception attack simply by making sure she leaves
at least one path untouched to the destination [41], [30].
B. Bitcoin
Transactions Transaction validation requires nodes to be
aware of the ownership of funds and the balance of each
Bitcoin address. All this information can be learned from
the Bitcoin blockchain: an authenticated data structure that
effectively forms a ledger of all accepted transactions. Bitcoin
main innovation lies in its ability to synchronize the blockchain
in an asynchronous way, with attackers possibly attempting
to disrupt the process. Synchronization is crucial: conflicting
transactions attempting to transfer the exact same bitcoins to
different destinations may otherwise be approved by miners
that are unaware of each other.
Block creation Bitcoin’s blockchain is comprised of blocks,
batches of transactions, that are appended to the ledger serially.
Each block contains a cryptographic hash of its predecessor,
which identifies its place in the chain, and a proof-of-work.
The proof-of-work serves to make block creation difficult and
reduces the conflicts in the system. Conflicts, which take
the form of blocks that extend the same parent, represent
alternative sets of accepted transactions. Nodes converge to
a single agreed version by selecting the chain containing the
highest amount of computational work as the valid version
(usually the longest chain). The proof-of-work also serves to
limit the ability of attackers to subvert the system: they cannot
easily create many blocks, which would potentially allow them
to create a longer alternative chain that will be adopted by
nodes and thus reverse the transfer of funds (double spend).
The difficulty of block creation is set so that one block is
created in the network every 10 minutes on average which
is designed to allow sufficient time for blocks to propagate
through the network. However, if delays are high compared to
the block creation rate, many forks occur in the chain as blocks
are created in parallel. In this case, the rate of discarded blocks
(known as the orphan rate or the fork rate) increases and the
security of the protocol deteriorates [20], [26], [49]. Newly
created blocks are propagated through the network using a
gossip protocol. In addition to the propagation of blocks, nodes
also propagate transactions between them that await inclusion
in the chain by whichever node creates the next block.
Network formation Bitcoin acts as a peer-to-peer network
with each node maintaining a list of IP addresses of potential
peers. The list is bootstrapped via a DNS server, and additional
addresses are exchanged between peers. By default, each node
randomly initiates 8 unencrypted TCP connections to peers in
different /16 prefixes. Nodes additionally accept connections
initiated by others (by default on port 8333). The total number
of connections nodes can make is 125 by default.
Nodes continually listen to block announcements which are
sent via INV messages containing the hash of the announced
block. If a node determines that it does not hold a newly
announced block, it sends a GETDATA message to a single
neighbor. The peer then responds by sending the requested
information in a BLOCK message. Blocks that are requested
and do not arrive within 20 minutes trigger the disconnection
of the peer and are requested from another. Transaction prop-
agation occurs with a similar sequence of INV, GETDATA,
and TX messages in which nodes announce, request, and share
transactions that have not yet been included in the blockchain.
Mining pools Mining pools represent groups of miners that
divide block creation rewards between them in order to lower
the high economic risk associated with infrequent (but high)
payments. They usually operate using the Stratum protocol
[15]. The pool server is connected to a bitcoind node that
acts as a gateway to the Bitcoin network. The node collects
recent information regarding newly transmitted transactions
and newly built blocks which are then used to construct a
new block template. The template header is then sent via the
Stratum server to the miners who attempt to complete it to
a valid block. This is done by trying different values of the
nonce field in the header. If the block is completed, the result
is sent back to the Stratum server, which then uses the gateway
node to publish the newly formed block to the network.
Multi-homing Mining pools often use multiple gateways
hosted by diffrent Internet Service Providers. We refer to the
number of different ISPs a pool has as its multi-homing degree.
III. ROUTING ATTACKS ON BITCOIN
In this section, we give an overview of the two routing
attacks we describe in this paper: (i) partitioning the Bitcoin
network (Section III-A); and (ii) delaying the propagation of
blocks. For each attack, we briefly describe its effectiveness
and challenges as well as its impact on the Bitcoin ecosystem
(Section III-B).
A. Partitioning the Bitcoin Network
In this attack, an AS-level adversary seeks to isolate a set of
nodes P from the rest of the network, effectively partitioning
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Fig. 1: Illustration of how an AS-level adversary (AS8) can
intercept Bitcoin traffic by hijacking prefixes to isolate the set
of nodes P = (A,B,C,D,E, F ).
the Bitcoin network into two disjoint components. The actual
content of P depends on the attacker’s objectives and can
range from one or few merchant nodes, to a set of nodes
holding a considerable percentage of the total mining power.
Attack The attacker first diverts the traffic destined to nodes
in P by hijacking the most-specific prefixes hosting each
of the IP address. Once on-path, the attacker intercepts the
Bitcoin traffic (e.g., based on the TCP ports) and identifies
whether the corresponding connections cross the partition she
tries to create. If so, the attacker drops the packets. If not,
meaning the connections are contained within P , she monitors
the exchanged Bitcoin messages so as to detect “leakage
points”. Leakage points are nodes currently within P , which
maintain connections with nodes outside of P , that the attacker
cannot intercept, namely “stealth” connections. The attacker
can detect these nodes automatically and isolate them from
others in P (Section IV). Eventually, the attacker isolates the
maximal set of nodes in P that can be isolated.
Example We illustrate the partition attack on the simple
network in Fig. 1 that is composed of 8 ASes, some of which
host Bitcoin nodes. Two mining pools are depicted as a green
(left) and a red (right) region. Both pools are multi-homed and
have gateways in different ASes. For instance, the red (right)
pool has gateways hosted in AS4, AS5, and AS6. We denote
the initial Bitcoin connections with blue lines, and those that
have been diverted via hijacking with red lines. Dashed black
lines represent private connections within the pools. Any AS
on the path of a connection can intercept it.
Consider an attack by AS8 that is meant to isolate the set
of nodes P = (A,B,C,D,E, F ). First, it hijacks the prefixes
advertised by AS1, AS2 and AS6, as they host nodes within
P , effectively attracting the traffic destined to them. Next, AS8
drops all connections crossing the partition: i.e., (A, J), (B, J)
and (F,G).
Observe that node F is within the isolated set P , but is
also a gateway of the red pool with which F most likely
A
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Fig. 2: Illustration of how an AS-level adversary (AS8) which
naturally intercepts a part of the traffic can delay the delivery
of a block for 20 minutes to a victim node (C).
communicates. This connection may not be based on the
Bitcoin protocol and thus it cannot be intercepted (at least,
not easily). As such, even if the attacker drops all the Bitcoin
connections she intercepts, node F may still learn about trans-
actions and blocks produced on the other side and might leak
this information within P . Isolating P as such is infeasible.
However, AS8 can identify that node F is the leakage point
during the attack and exclude it from P , essentially isolating
I ′ = (A,B,C,D,E) instead. This I ′ is actually the maximum
subset of P that can be isolated from the Bitcoin network.
Practicality We extensively evaluate the practicality of iso-
lating sets of nodes of various sizes (Section VII). We briefly
summarize our findings. First, we performed a real BGP hijack
against our own Bitcoin nodes and show that it takes less than
2 minutes for an attacker to divert Bitcoin traffic. Second, we
estimated the number of prefixes to hijack so as to isolate
nodes with a given amount of mining power. We found that
hijacking only 39 prefixes is enough to isolate a specific
set of nodes which accounts for almost 50% of the overall
mining power. Through a longitudinal analysis spanning over
6 months, we found that much larger hijacks happen regularly
and that some of them have already impacted Bitcoin traffic.
Third, we show that, while effective, partitions do not last
long after the attack stops: the two components of the partition
quickly reconnect, owing to natural churn. Yet, it takes hours
for the two components to be densely connected again.
Impact The impact of a partitioning attack depends on the
number of isolated nodes and how much mining power they
have. Isolating a few nodes essentially constitutes a denial of
service attack and renders them vulnerable to 0-confirmation
double spends. Disconnecting a considerable amount of min-
ing power can lead to the creation of two different versions
of the blockchain. All blocks mined on the side with the least
mining power will be discarded and all included transactions
are likely to be reversed. Such an attack would cause revenue
loss for the miners on the side with least mining power and
a prominent risk of double spends. The side with the most
mining power would also suffer from an increased risk of
selfish mining attacks by adversaries with mining power.
B. Slowing down the Bitcoin network
In a delay attack, the attacker’s goal is to slow down the
propagation of new blocks sent to a set of Bitcoin nodes
without disrupting their connections. As with partitioning, the
attack can be targeted, aimed at selected nodes, or network-
wide, aimed at disrupting the ability of the entire network to
reach consensus [20]. Unlike partitioning attacks though, an
attacker can delay the overall propagation of blocks towards
a node even if she intercepts a subset of its connections.
Attack Delay attacks leverage three key aspects of the Bitcoin
protocol: (i) the asymmetry in the way Bitcoin nodes exchange
blocks using INV, GETDATA, and BLOCK messages (Sec-
tion II); (ii) the fact that these messages are not protected
against tampering (unencrypted, no secure integrity checks);
and (iii) the fact that a Bitcoin node waits for 20 minutes
after having requested a block from a peer before requesting
it again from another peer. These protocol features enable
an attacker intercepting even one direction of the victim’s
connection to delay the propagation of a block, as long as this
connection is traversed by either the actual BLOCK message
or the corresponding GETDATA.
Specifically, if the attacker intercepts the traffic from the
victim, she can modify the content of the GETDATA message
the victim uses to ask for blocks. By preserving the message
length and structure and by updating the TCP and Bitcoin
checksums, the modified message is accepted by the receiver
and the connection stays alive. If the attacker intercepts the
traffic towards a node, she can instead corrupt the content of
the BLOCK message such that the victim considers it invalid.
In both cases, the recipient of the blocks remains uninformed
for 20 minutes.
Example As an illustration, consider Fig. 2, and assume that
AS8 is the attacker and C, the victim. Suppose that A and B
both advertise a block (say, block X) to C via an INV message
and that, without loss of generality, the message from A arrives
at C first. C will then send a GETDATA message back to
A requesting block X and start a 20 minute timeout count.
By modifying the content of the GETDATA node A receives,
AS8 indirectly controls what node A will send to node C.
This way the attacker can delay the delivery of the block by
up to 20 minutes while avoiding detection and disconnection.
Alternatively, AS8 could modify the BLOCK message.
Practicality We verified the practicality of delay attacks by
implementing an interception software which we used against
our own Bitcoin nodes. We show that intercepting 50% of a
node connections is enough to keep the node uninformed for
63% of its uptime (Section VIII).
We also evaluated the impact that ASes, which are naturally
traversed by a lot of Bitcoin traffic, could have on the network
using a scalable event-driven simulator. We found that due to
the relatively high degree of multi-homing that pools employ,
only very powerful coalitions of network attackers (e.g., all
ASes based in the US) could perform a network-wide delay
attack. Such an attack is thus unlikely to occur in practice.
Impact Similarly to partitioning attacks, the impact of a delay
attack depends on the number and type (e.g., pool gateway)
of impacted nodes. At the node-level, delay attacks can keep
the victim eclipsed, essentially performing a denial of service
attack or rendering it vulnerable to 0-confirmation double
spends. If the node is a gateway of a pool, such attacks can
be used to engineer block races, and waste the mining power
of the pool. Network-wide attacks increase the fork rate and
render the network vulnerable to other exploits. If a sufficient
number of blocks are discarded, miners revenue is decreased
and the network is more vulnerable to double spending. A
slowdown of block transmission can be used to launch selfish
mining attacks by adversaries with mining power.
IV. PARTITIONING BITCOIN
In this section, we elaborate on partition attacks in which
an AS-level adversary seeks to isolate a set of nodes P . We
first describe which partitions are feasible by defining which
connections may cause information leakage (Section IV-A)
to the isolated set. We then discuss how an attacker may
better select a P that is feasible, if she has some view of the
Bitcoin topology (Section IV-B). Next, we walk through the
entire attack process, starting with the interception of Bitcoin
traffic, the detection of leakage points and the adaptation of
P until the partition is successfully created (Section IV-C). In
particular, we present an algorithm which, given a set of nodes
P , leads the attacker to isolate the maximal feasible subset.
Finally, we prove that our algorithm is correct (Section IV-D).
A. Characterizing feasible partitions
An attacker can isolate a set of nodes P from the network
if and only if all connections (a, b) where a ∈ P and b 6∈ P
can be intercepted. We refer to such connections as vulnerable
and to connections that the attacker cannot intercept as stealth.
Vulnerable connections: A connection is vulnerable if: (i) an
attacker can divert it via a BGP hijack; and (ii) it uses the
Bitcoin protocol. The first requirement enables the attacker to
intercept the corresponding packets, while the second enables
her to identify and then drop or monitor these packets.
As an illustration, consider Fig. 3a, and assume that the
attacker, AS8, wants to isolate P = {A,B,C}. By hijacking
the prefixes pertaining to these nodes the attacker receives all
traffic from nodes A and B to node C, as well as the traffic
from node D to node A. The path the hijacked traffic follows is
depicted with red dashed lines and the original path with blue
lines. As all nodes communicate using the Bitcoin protocol,
their connections can easily be distinguished, as we explain in
Section IV-C. Here, AS8 can partition P from the rest of the
network by dropping the connection from node D to node A.
Stealth connections: A connection is stealth if the attacker
cannot intercept it. We distinguish three types of stealth
connections: (i) intra-AS; (ii) intra-pool; and (iii) pool-to-pool.
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Fig. 3: Not all Bitcoin connections can be diverted by an attacker implying that some partitions cannot be formed.
intra-AS: An attacker cannot intercept connections within the
same AS using BGP hijack. Indeed, internal traffic does not get
routed by BGP, but by internal routing protocols (e.g., OSPF,
EIGRP). Thus, any intra-AS connection crossing the partition
border renders the partition infeasible. Such connections rep-
resent only 1.14% of all the possible connection nodes can
create (this percentage is calculated based on the topology we
inferred in Section VI).
As an illustration, consider Fig. 3b and assume that the
attacker, AS8, wants to isolate P = {A,B,C}. By hijacking
the corresponding BGP prefixes, AS8 can intercept the con-
nections running between nodes A and B to node C. However,
she does not intercept the intra-AS connection between A and
X . This means that node X will inform node A of the blocks
mined in the rest of the network, and node A will then relay
this information further within P . Thus, P = {A,B,C} is not
feasible. Yet, observe that isolating I = {B,C} is possible. In
the following, we explain how the attacker can detect that A
maintains a stealth connection leading outside of the partition
and dynamically adapt to isolate I instead.
intra-pool: Similarly to intra-AS connections, an attacker
might not be able to cut connections between gateways be-
longing to the same mining pool. This is because mining
pools might rely on proprietary or even encrypted protocols
for internal communication.
As an illustration, consider Fig. 3c and assume that the at-
tacker, AS8, wants to isolate P = {A,B,C,D}. By hijacking
the corresponding prefixes, she would intercept and cut all
Bitcoin connections between nodes A, B, C, D and nodes E,
F. However, nodes A and F would still be connected internally
as they belong to the same (green) pool. Again, observe that
while isolating P = {A,B,C,D} is not feasible, isolating
I = {B,C,D} from the rest of the network is possible.
pool-to-pool: Finally, an attacker cannot intercept (possi-
bly encrypted) private connections, corresponding to peering
agreements between mining pools. From the attacker’s point
of view, these connections can be treated as intra-pool connec-
tions and the corresponding pair of pools can be considered as
one larger pool. Note that such connections are different than
public initiatives to interconnect all pools, such as the Bitcoin
relays [13]. Unlike private peering agreements, relays cannot
act as bridges to the partition (see Appendix E).
B. Preparing for the attack
In light of these limitations the attacker can apply two
techniques to avoid having stealth connections crossing the
partition she creates. First, she can include in P either all or
none of the nodes of an AS, to avoid intra-AS connections
crossing the partition. This can be easily done as the mapping
from IPs to ASNs is publicly available [11]. Second, she can
include in P either all or none of the gateways of a pool, to
avoid intra-pool connections crossing the partition. Doing so
requires the attacker to know all the gateways of the mining
pools she wants to include in P . Inferring the gateways is
outside the scope of this paper, yet the attacker could use
techniques described in [36] and leverage her ability to inspect
the traffic of almost every node via hijacking (see Appendix
C). Even with the above measures, P may still contain leakage
points that the attacker will need to identify and exclude
(see below). Yet, these considerations increase the chances of
establishing the desired partition as well as reducing the time
required to achieve it.
C. Performing the attack
We now describe how a network adversary can successfully
perform a partitioning attack. The attack is composed of two
main phases: (i) diverting relevant Bitcoin traffic; and (ii)
enforcing the partition. In the former phase, the adversary
diverts relevant Bitcoin traffic using BGP hijacking. In the
latter phase, the attacker cuts all vulnerable connections that
cross the partition and excludes from P nodes which are
identified as leakage points. Leakage points are nodes that are
connected to the rest of the network via stealth connections.
Intercept Bitcoin traffic: The attacker starts by hijacking
all the prefixes pertaining to the Bitcoin nodes she wants to
isolate, i.e. all the prefixes covering the IP addresses of nodes
in P . As a result, she receives all the traffic destined to these
prefixes, which she splits into two packet streams: relevant and
Algorithm 1: Partitioning algorithm.
Input: - P , a set of Bitcoin IP addresses to disconnect from
the rest of the Bitcoin network; and
- S = [pkt1, · · ·], an infinite packet stream of
diverted Bitcoin traffic resulting from the hijack of the
prefixes pertaining to P .
Output: False if there is no node ∈ P that can be verifiably
isolated;
1 enforce_partition(P, S):
2 begin
3 U ← ∅ ;
4 L← ∅ ;
5 while P \ (L ∪ U) 6= ∅ do
6 for pkt ∈ S do
7 if pkt.ip_src ∈ P ∧ pkt.ip_src /∈ L then
8 last_seen[pkt.ip_dst] = now() ;
9 U ← U \ {pkt.ip_src} ;
10 detect_leakage(U, pkt) ;
11 else
12 drop(pkt) ;
13 for src ∈ P ∧ src /∈ L do
14 if last_seen[src] > now()− threshold then
15 U ← U ∪ {src}
16 return false ;
irrelevant. Relevant traffic includes any Bitcoin traffic destined
to nodes in P . This traffic should be further investigated.
Irrelevant traffic corresponds to the remaining traffic which
should be forwarded back to its legitimate destination.
To distinguish between relevant and irrelevant traffic, the
attacker applies a simple filter matching on the IP addresses,
the transport protocol and ports used, as well as certain bits
of the TCP payload. Specifically, the attacker first classifies
as irrelevant all non-TCP traffic as well as all traffic with
destination IPs which are not included in P . In contrast,
the attacker classifies as relevant all traffic with destination
or source TCP port the default Bitcoin port (8333). Finally,
she classifies as relevant all packets which have a Bitcoin
header in the TCP payload. Any remaining traffic is considered
irrelevant.
Partitioning algorithm: Next, the attacker processes the
relevant traffic according to Algorithms 1 and 2. We start by
presenting their goal before describing them in more details.
The high-level goal of the algorithms is to isolate as many
nodes in P as possible. To do so, the algorithms identify
L, the nodes that are leakage points, and disconnect them
from the other nodes in P . Also, the algorithms maintain a
set of verifiably isolated nodes P ′ = P \ {U ∪ L}, where
U corresponds to the nodes that cannot be monitored (e.g.,
because they never send packets). In particular, Algorithm 2
is in charge of identifying L, while Algorithm 1 is in charge
of identifying U and performing the isolation itself.
We now describe how the algorithms work. Algorithm 1
starts by initializing L and U to ∅. For every received packet,
the algorithm first decides whether the packet belongs to a
Algorithm 2: Leakage detection algorithm.
Input: - U , a set of Bitcoin IP addresses the attacker cannot
monitor; and
- pkt, a (parsed) diverted Bitcoin packet.
1 detect_leakage(U, pkt):
2 begin
3 if contains_block(pkt) ∨ contains_inv(pkt) then
4 if hash(pkt) ∈ Blocks(¬(P \ L)) then
5 L← L ∪ {pkt.ip_src} ;
6 drop(pkt) ;
connection internal to P \ L or to one between a node in
P \ L and an external node based on the source IP address.
If the source IP is in P \L, the packet belongs to an internal
connection and it is given to Algorithm 2 to investigate if
the corresponding node acts as a leakage point (Algorithm 1,
Line 10). Otherwise, the packet belongs to a connection that
crosses the partition and is dropped (Algorithm 1, Line 12).
Given a packet originated from P \ L, Algorithm 2 checks
whether the sender of the packet is advertising information
from outside of P \L. Particularly, the attacker checks whether
the packet contains an INV message with the hash of a block
mined outside of P \ L (or the block itself). If it does so,
the sender must have a path of stealth connections to a node
outside of P \L from which the block was transmitted. Thus
the sender is a leakage point and is added to L (Algorithm 2,
Line 5). The actual packet is also dropped to prevent this
information from spreading.
To detect whether a node in P \ L is a leakage point, an
attacker should be able to intercept at least one of that node’s
connections. Specifically, the node should have a vulnerable
connection to another node within P \ L, so that the attacker
can monitor the blocks it advertises. To keep track of the
nodes that the attacker cannot monitor, Algorithm 1 maintains
a set U which contains the nodes she has not received any
packets from for a predefined time threshold. (Algorithm 1,
Line 15). Whenever one of these nodes manages to a establish
a connection that the attacker intercepts, it is removed from
U (Algorithm 1, Line 9).
Example: We now show how the algorithms work on the
example of Fig. 3b in which the attacker, AS8, aims to isolate
P = {A,B,C}. By hijacking the prefixes corresponding to
these nodes, the attacker intercepts the connections (B,C) and
(A,C) and feeds the relevant packets to the algorithms. Recall
that the partition is bridged by a stealth (intra-AS) connection
between nodes A and X which cannot be intercepted by the
attacker. When a block outside P is mined, node X will inform
A which then will advertise the block to C. The attacker will
catch this advertisement and will conclude that node A is a
leakage point. After that, the attacker will drop the packet and
will add A to L. As such, all future packets from A to other
nodes within P \ L = {A,B} will be dropped. Observe that
the partition isolating P \L = {B,C} is indeed the maximum
feasible subset of P .
D. Correctness of the partitioning algorithm
We now prove the properties of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. Given P , a set of nodes to disconnect from the
Bitcoin network, there exists a unique maximal subset I ⊆
P that can be isolated. Given the assumption that Bitcoin
nodes advertise blocks that they receive to all their peers,
Algorithm 1 isolates all nodes in I , and maintains a set P ′ =
P \ {U ∪ L} ⊆ I that contains all nodes in I that have a
monitored connection and are thus known to be isolated.
Proof. Consider the set of nodes S ⊆ P that has a path of
stealth connections to some nodes not in P . Clearly, nodes
in S cannot be isolated from the rest of the network by the
attacker. Let I = P \ S. Notice that I is the maximal set in
P that can be disconnected by an attacker. Now, notice that
every node in S is placed in sets L or U by the algorithm: if
the node has a monitored connection and is caught advertising
external blocks it is placed in L (Algorithm 2 Line 5). If it is
not monitored then it is placed in U (Algorithm 1, Line 15).
Notice also that the entire set I is isolated from the network.
If some node has no stealth connection outside, and was
removed solely for the lack of monitoring, it is still having
all its packets from outside of P \ L dropped – Algorithm 1
Line 12).
V. DELAYING BLOCK PROPAGATION
While partitioning attacks (Section IV) are particularly
effective and can be performed by any AS, they require full
control over the victim’s traffic and are also highly visible.
In this section, we explore delay attacks, which can cause
relatively severe delays in block propagation, even when an
attacker intercepts only one of the victim’s connections, and
wishes the attack to remain relatively undetectable.
In this attack, the adversary delays the delivery of a block
by modifying the content of specific messages. This is possible
due to the lack of encryption and of secure integrity checks of
Bitcoin messages. In addition to these, the attacker leverages
the fact that nodes send block requests to the first peer that
advertised each block and wait 20 minutes for its delivery,
before requesting it from another peer.
The first known attack leveraging this 20 minutes time-
out [28] mandates the adversary to be connected to the victim
and to be the first to advertise a new block. After a successful
block delay, the connection is lost. In contrast, network-based
delay attacks are more effective for at least three reasons: (i) an
attacker can act on existing connections, namely she does not
need to connect to the victim which is very often not possible
(e.g, nodes behind a NAT); (ii) an attacker does not have to be
informed about recently mined blocks by the victim’s peers to
eclipse it; and (iii) the connection that was used for the attack
is not necessarily lost, prolonging the attack.
Particularly, the effectiveness of the delay attack depends
on the direction and fraction of the victim’s traffic the attacker
intercepts. Intuitively, as Bitcoin clients request blocks from
one peer at a time, the probability that the attacker will
GET DATA 
Block #42
INV  
Block #42 INV  
Block #42
GET DATA 
Block #30
GET DATA 
Tx #123GET DATA 
Block #42
Block #42
up to 
20 min
victimattacker
Block #30
ignored
(a) x Attacker x victim
GET DATA 
Block #42
INV  
Block #42 INV  
Block #42
20 min
Block #42
Block #4@!
DISCONNECT/ 
TIMEOUT
wrong 
checksum!
victimattacker
(b) y Attacker y victim
Fig. 4: An attacker can perform different delay attacks depend-
ing on the direction of traffic she intercepts. When on the path
from the victim, it can modify the GETDATA message (a),
while it can modify the BLOCK message when intercepting
the opposite path (b).
intercept such a connection increases proportionally with the
fraction of the connections she intercepts. In addition, Bitcoin
connections are bi-directional TCP connections, meaning the
attacker may intercept one direction (e.g., if the victim is
multi-homed), both, or none at all. Depending on the direction
she intercepts, the attacker fiddles with different messages.
In the following, we explain the mechanism that is used to
perform the attack if the attacker intercepts traffic from the
victim (Section V-A) or to the victim node (Section V-B).
While in both cases the attacker does delay block propagation
for 20 minutes, the former attack is more effective.
A. The attacker intercepts outgoing traffic
Once a node receives a notification that a new block is
available via an INV message, it issues a download request
to its sender using a GETDATA message. As an illustration
in Fig. 4a the victim requests Block 42 from the first of its
peers that advertised the block. Since the attacker intercepts
the traffic from the victim to this peer, she can modify this
GETDATA message to request an older block, instead of the
original one. In Fig. 4a for example, the attacker replaces the
hash corresponding to block 42 with that of block 30. The
advantage of doing so, over just dropping the packet, is that
the length of the message is left unchanged. Notice that if
the packet was dropped the attacker would need to intercept
both directions of the connection and update the TCP sequence
numbers of all following packets to ensure that the connection
is not dropped. If the block is not delivered, the victim node
will disconnect after 20 minutes. To avoid a disconnection,
the attacker can use another GETDATA, sent within the 20
minute window, to perform the reverse operation. Specifically,
she modifies the hash back to the original one, requested
by the victim. Since the GETDATA message for blocks and
transactions have the same structure, the attacker is more likely
to use the latter as these are much more common. In Fig. 4a
for example, she changes the hash of the transaction (Tx #123)
to the hash of block 42. Since the block is delivered within the
timeout neither of the nodes disconnects or has any indication
of the attack (e.g., an error in the log files).
B. The attacker intercepts incoming traffic
We now describe the mechanism an attacker would use
if she intercepts traffic towards the victim, i.e. she can see
messages received by the victim, but not the messages that
it sends. This attack is less effective compared to the attack
working in the opposite direction, as it will eventually result in
the connection being dropped 20 minutes after the first delayed
block (similarly to [28]). In this case, the attack focuses on
the BLOCK messages rather than on the GETDATA. A naive
attack would be for the attacker to simply drop any BLOCK
message she sees. As Bitcoin relies on TCP though, doing
so would quickly kill the TCP connection. A better, yet still
simple approach is for the attacker to corrupt the contents of
a BLOCK message while preserving the length of the packet
(see Fig. 4b). This simple operation causes the BLOCK to be
discarded when it reaches the victim, because of a checksum
mismatch. Surprisingly though, we discovered (and verified)
that the victim will not request the block again, be it from the
same or any other peer. After the 20 minute timeout elapses,
the victim simply disconnects because its requested block did
not arrive on time.
An alternative for the adversary is to replace the hash of the
most recent Block with a hash of an older one in all the INV
messages the victim receives. This attack however would fail
if the attacker intercepts only a fraction of the connections, as
the victim will be informed via other connections. As such,
this practice is only useful when the attacker hijacks and thus
intercepts all the traffic directed to the victim.
VI. HOW VULNERABLE IS BITCOIN TO ROUTING
ATTACKS? A COMPREHENSIVE MEASUREMENT ANALYSIS
Evaluating the impact of routing attacks requires a good
understanding of the routing characteristics of the Bitcoin
network. In this section, we explain the datasets and the
techniques used to infer a combined Internet and Bitcoin
topology (Section VI-A). We then discuss our key findings and
their impact on the effectiveness of the two routing attacks we
consider (Section VI-B).
A. Methodology and datasets
Our study is based on three key datasets: (i) the IP addresses
used by Bitcoin nodes and gateways of pools; (ii) the portion
of mining power each pool possesses; (iii) the forwarding path
taken between any two IPs. While we collected these datasets
over a period of 6 months, starting from October 2015 through
March 2016, we focus on the results from a 10 day period
starting from November 5th 2015, as the results of our analysis
do not change much through time.
Bitcoin IPs We started by collecting the IPs of regular
nodes (which host no mining power) along with the IPs of
the gateways the pools use to connect to the network. We
gathered this dataset by combining information collected by
two Bitcoin supernodes with publicly available data regarding
mining pools. One supernode was connected to ∼2000 Bitcoin
nodes per day, collecting block propagation information, while
the other was crawling the Bitcoin network, collecting the
∼6,000 IPs of active nodes each day.
We inferred which of these IPs act as the gateway of a pool
in two steps. First, we used block propagation information
(gathered by the first supernode), considering that the gateways
of a pool are most likely the first to propagate the blocks this
pool mines. Particularly, we assigned IPs to pools based on
the timing of the INV messages received by the supernode.
We considered a given IP to belong to a gateway of a pool
if: (i) it relayed blocks of that pool more than once during
the 10 day period; and (ii) it frequently was the first to relay
a block of that pool (at least half as many times as the most
frequent node for that pool). Second, we also considered as
extra gateways the IPs of the stratum servers used by each
mining pool. Indeed, previous studies [36] noted that stratum
servers tend to be co-located in the same prefix as the pool’s
gateway. Since the URLs of the stratum servers are public
(Section II), we simply resolved the DNS name (found on the
pools websites or by directly connecting to them) and add the
corresponding IPs to our IP-to-pool dataset.
Mining power To infer the mining power attached to pools,
we tracked how many blocks each pool mined during the
10 days interval [2] and simply assigned them a proportional
share of the total mining power.
AS-level topology and forwarding paths We used the AS-
level topologies provided by CAIDA [5] to infer the for-
warding paths taken between any two ASes. An AS-level
topology is a directed graph in which a node corresponds
to an AS and a link represents an inter-domain connection
between two neighboring ASes. Links are labeled with the
business relationship linking the two ASes (customer, peer or
provider). We computed the actual forwarding paths following
the routing tree algorithm described in [30] which takes into
account the business relationships between ASes.
Mapping Bitcoin nodes to ASes We finally inferred the
most-specific prefix and the AS hosting each Bitcoin node
by processing more than 2.5 million BGP routes (covering all
Internet prefixes) advertised on 182 BGP sessions maintained
by 3 RIPE BGP collectors [10] (rrc00, rrc01 and rrc03). The
mapping is done by associating each prefix to the origin AS
advertising it and by validating the stability of that origin AS
over time (to avoid having the mapping polluted by hijacks).
B. Findings
We now discuss the key characteristics of the Bitcoin
network from the Internet routing perspective. We explain
which of them constitute enablers or hindrances for an AS-
level attacker.
A few ASes host most of the Bitcoin nodes Fig. 5a depicts
the cumulative fraction of Bitcoin nodes as a function of the
number of hosting ASes. We see that only 13 (resp. 50) ASes
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percentages of Bitcoin traffic: 3
of them intercept 60% of all
possible Bitcoin connections.
Fig. 5: Bitcoin is heavily centralized from a routing viewpoint.
host 30% (resp. 50%) of the entire Bitcoin network. These
ASes pertain to broadband providers such as Comcast (US),
Verizon (US) or Chinanet (CN) as well as to cloud providers
such as Hetzner (DE), OVH (FR) and Amazon (US). We
observe the same kind of concentration when considering the
distribution of Bitcoin nodes per IP prefix: only 63 prefixes
(0.012% of the Internet) host 20% of the network.
Regarding delay attacks, this high concentration makes
Bitcoin traffic more easy to intercept and therefore more
vulnerable. With few ASes hosting many nodes, any AS on-
path (including the host ASes) is likely to intercept many
connections at once, making delay attacks more disruptive.
Regarding partition attacks, the effect of the concentration is a
bit more nuanced. Indeed, high concentration reduces the total
number of feasible partitions because of intra-AS connections
that cannot be intercepted (Section IV-A). At the same time,
tough, the remaining feasible partitions are much easier to
achieve since they require fewer hijacked prefixes (Section IV).
A few ASes naturally intercept the majority of the Bit-
coin traffic Large transit providers (i.e., Tier-1s) tend to be
traversed by a large fraction of all the Bitcoin connections.
Fig. 5b depicts the cumulative percentage of connections that
can be intercepted by an increasing number of ASes (e.g.,
by colluding with each other). We see that only three ASes,
namely Hurricane Electric, Level3, and Telianet, can together
intercept more than 60% of all possible Bitcoin connections,
with Hurricane alone being on path for 32% of all connections.
Regarding delay attacks, these few ASes could act as
powerful delay attackers. Regarding partition attacks, this ob-
servation does not have any direct implication as partitioning
requires a full cut to be effective (Section IV).
>90% of Bitcoin nodes are vulnerable to BGP hijacks
93% of all prefixes hosting Bitcoin nodes are shorter than
/24, making them vulnerable to a global IP hijack using
more-specific announcements. Indeed, prefixes strictly longer
than /24 (i.e., /25 or longer) are filtered by default by many
ISPs. Observe that the remaining 7% hosted in /24s are not
necessarily safe. These can still be hijacked by another AS
performing a shortest-path attack, i.e., the attacker, who will
advertise a /24 just like the victim’s provider will attract traffic
from all ASes that are closer to her in terms of number of hops.
While this finding does not have a direct impact on delay
attacks, it clearly helps partition attackers as they can divert
almost all Bitcoin traffic to their infrastructure (modulo stealth
connections, see Section IV).
Mining pools tend to be distributed and multi-homed
Mining pools have a complex infrastructure compared to
regular nodes. We found that all pools use at least two ASes
to connect to the Bitcoin network, while larger pools such as
Antpool, F2Pools, GHash.IO, Kano use up to 5 ASes.
Pool multi-homing makes both network attacks more chal-
lenging and is one of the main precaution measures node
owners can use against routing attacks. While harder, routing
attacks are still possible in the presence of multi-homing as
we illustrate in Section VIII.
Bitcoin routing properties are stable over time While nu-
merous nodes continuously join and leave the Bitcoin network,
the routing properties highlighted in this section are stable. As
validation, we ran our analysis daily over a 4 month period.
We found that the same IPs were present on average for 15.2
consecutive days (excluding IPs that were seen only once).
Moreover, 50 ASes hosted each day 49.5% of Bitcoin clients
(standard deviation: 1.2%) while 24.7% of Bitcoin nodes are
found daily in just 100 prefixes (standard deviation: 1.77%).
VII. PARTITIONING BITCOIN: EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the practicality and effectiveness
of partitioning attacks by considering four different aspects of
the attack. First, we show that diverting Bitcoin traffic using
BGP hijacks works in practice by performing an actual hijack
targeting our own Bitcoin nodes (Section VII-A). Second, we
show that hijacking fewer than 100 prefixes is enough to
isolate a large amount of the mining power due to Bitcoin’s
centralization (Section VII-B). Third, we show that much
larger hijacks already happen in the Internet today, some
already diverting Bitcoin traffic (Section VII-C). Fourth, we
show that Bitcoin quickly recovers from a partition attack once
it has stopped (Section VII-D).
A. How long does it take to divert traffic with a hijack?
We hijacked and isolated our own Bitcoin nodes which were
connected to the live network via our own public IP prefixes.
In the following, we describe our methodology as well as our
findings with regard to the time it takes for a partition to be
established.
Methodology We built our own virtual AS with full BGP
connectivity using Transit Portal (TP) [46]. TP provides virtual
ASes with BGP connectivity to the rest of the Internet by
proxying their BGP announcements via multiple worldwide
deployments, essentially acting as a multi-homed provider to
the virtual AS. In our experiment, we used the Amsterdam
TP deployment as provider and advertised 184.164.232.0/22 to
it. Our virtual AS hosted six bitcoin nodes (v/Satoshi:0.13.0/).
Each node had a public IP in 184.164.232.0/22 (.1 to .6
addresses) and could therefore accept connections from any
other Bitcoin node in the Internet.
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Fig. 6: Intercepting Bitcoin traffic using BGP hijack is fast
and effective: all the traffic was flowing through the attacker
within 90 seconds. Results computed while performing an
actual BGP hijack against our own Bitcoin nodes.
We performed a partition attack against our 6 nodes using
BGP hijacking. For this, we used Cornell, another TP
deployment, as the malicious AS. Specifically, we advertised
the prefix 184.164.235.0/24 via the Cornell TP. This ad-
vertisement is a more-specific prefix with respect to the an-
nouncement coming from the Amsterdam TP and covers all
the IPs of our nodes. Thus, after the new prefix announcement
is propagated throughout the Internet, Bitcoin traffic directed
to any of our nodes will transit via Cornell instead of
Amsterdam. To mimic an interception attack (Section II),
we configured the Cornell TP to forward traffic back to
our AS. As such, connections to our nodes stayed up during
the hijack even though they experienced a higher delay.
We performed the attacks 30 times and measured the time
elapsed from announcement of the most specific prefix until
all traffic towards our nodes was sent via the Cornell TP.
Diverting Bitcoin traffic via BGP is fast (takes <2 minutes)
The results of our experiment are shown in Fig. 6. The
main insight is that the attacker received the hijacked traffic
very quickly. After only 20 seconds, more than 50% of the
connections are diverted. Within 1.5 minutes, all traffic was
transiting via the malicious AS. Thus, attacked nodes are
effectively isolated almost as soon as the hijack starts.
We took great care to ensure that our experiments did not
negatively impact the actual Bitcoin network. We discuss the
ethical considerations behind our experiments in Appendix F.
B. How many prefixes must be hijacked to isolate mining
power?
Having shown that hijacking prefixes is an efficient way
to divert Bitcoin traffic, we now study the practicality of
isolating a specific set of nodes P . We focus on isolating sets
holding mining power because they are: (i) more challenging
to perform (as mining pools tend to be multi-homed); and (ii)
more disruptive as successfully partitioning mining power can
lead to the creation of parallel branches in the blockchain.
To that end, we first estimate the number of prefixes the
attacker needs to hijack to isolate a specific set of nodes as
a function of the mining power they hold. In the following
subsection, we evaluate how practical a hijack of that many
Isolated
mining power
min. # pfxes
to hijack
median # pfxes
to hijack
# feasible
partitions
8% 32 70 14
30% 83 83 1
40% 37 80 8
47% 39 39 1
TABLE I: Hijacking <100 prefixes is enough to feasibly
partition ∼50% of the mining power. Complete table in Ap-
pendix B.
prefixes is with respect to the hijacks that frequently take place
in the Internet.
Methodology As described in Section IV, not all sets of nodes
can be isolated as some connections cannot be intercepted. We
therefore only determine the number of prefixes required to
isolate sets P that are feasible in the topology we inferred in
Section VI. In particular, we only consider the sets of nodes
that contain: (i) either all nodes of an AS or none of them; and
(ii) either the entire mining pool, namely all of its gateways or
none of them. With these restrictions, we essentially avoid the
possibility of having any leakage point within P , that is caused
by an intra-AS or intra-pool stealth connection. However, we
cannot account for secret peering agreements that may or may
not exist between pools. Such agreements are inherently kept
private and their existence is difficult to ascertain.
Hijacking <100 prefixes is enough to isolate ∼50% of
Bitcoin mining power In Table I we show the number of
different feasible sets of nodes we found containing the same
amount of mining power (4th and 1st column, respectively).
We also include the minimum and median number of the
prefixes the attacker would need to hijack to isolate each
portion of mining power (2nd and 3rd column, respectively).
As predicted by the centralization of the Bitcoin network
(Section VI), the number of prefixes an attacker needs to hijack
to create a feasible partition is small: hijacking less than 100
prefixes is enough to isolate up to 47% of the mining power. As
we will describe next, hijack events involving similar numbers
of prefixes happen regularly in the Internet. Notice that the
number of prefixes is not proportional to the isolated mining
power. For example, there is a set of nodes representing 47%
of mining power that can be isolated by hijacking 39 prefixes,
while isolating 30% of the mining power belonging to different
pools would require 83 prefixes. Indeed, an attacker can isolate
additional mining power with the same number of hijacked
prefixes when several pools in the isolated set are hosted in
the same ASes.
C. How many hijacks happen today? Do they impact Bitcoin?
Having an estimate of the number of prefixes that need to
be hijacked to partition the entire network, we now look at
how common such hijacks are over a 6-months window, from
October 2015 to March 2016. We show that BGP hijacks are
not only prevalent, but also end up diverting Bitcoin traffic.
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(b) Each month, traffic for at
least 100 distinct Bitcoin nodes
end up diverted by hijacks.
Fig. 7: Routing manipulation (BGP hijacks) are prevalent
today and do impact Bitcoin traffic.
Methodology We detected BGP hijacks by processing 4
billion BGP updates advertised during this period on 182 BGP
sessions maintained by 3 RIPE BGP collectors [10] (rrc00,
rrc01 and rrc03). We consider an update for a prefix p as
a hijack if the origin AS differs from the origin AS seen
during the previous month. To avoid false positives, we do
not consider prefixes which have seen multiple origin ASes
during the previous month. We count only a single hijack per
prefix and origin pair each day: if AS X hijacks the prefix p
twice in one day, we consider both as part of a single hijack.
Large BGP hijacks are frequent in today’s Internet, and
already end up diverting Bitcoin traffic Fig. 7 summarizes
our results. We see that there are hundreds of thousands of
hijack events each month (Fig. 7a). While most of these hijacks
involve a single IP prefix, large hijacks involving between 300
and 30,000 prefixes are also seen every month (right axis).
Fig 7b depicts the number of Bitcoin nodes for which traffic
was diverted in these hijacks. Each month, at least 100 Bitcoin
nodes are victim of hijacks2. As an illustration, 447 distinct
nodes (∼7.8% of the Bitcoin network) ended up hijacked at
least once in November 2015.
D. How long do the effects of a partition attack last?
Having investigated the methodology and the relative cost
of creating a partition, we now explore how quickly the
Bitcoin network recovers from a partition attack. We found
out that while the two components quickly reconnect, they
stay sparsely connected for a very long time. We first describe
the experimental set-up. Next, we explain why partitions are
not persistent in practice and briefly hint on how an attacker
could prolong their lifetime.
Methodology We build a testbed composed of 1050 Bitcoin
clients running the default bitcoind core (v0.12.1) in testnet
mode. Each node runs in a virtual machine connected to
a virtual switch and is configured with a different random
IP address. Nodes automatically connect to other nodes in
the testbed. We enforced a 50%–50% partition, by installing
drop rules on the switch which discard any packet belonging
2The actual hijack attempt may have been aimed at other services in the same
IP range, still, these nodes were affected and their traffic was re-routed.
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Fig. 8: Bitcoin heals slowly after large partition attacks. After
10h, only half as many connections cross the partition. Healing
is even slower if the attacker is naturally on-path for 13%,
18%, 28% of the connections.
to a connection crossing the partition. Observe that a 50%–
50% split is the easiest partition to recover from, as after the
attack the chance that a new connection would bridge the two
halves is maximal. We measure the partition recovery time by
recording the percentage of connections going from one side
to the other in 30 minute intervals.
Bitcoin TCP connections are kept alive for extended periods.
As such, new connections are mostly formed when nodes
reconnect or leave the network (churn). To simulate churn
realistically, we collected the lists of all reachable Bitcoin
nodes [3], every 5 minutes, from February 10 to March 10
2016. For every node i connected in the network on the
first day, we measured ti as the elapsed time until its first
disappearance. To determine the probability of a node to
reboot, we randomly associated every node in our testbed
with a type ti and assumed this node reboots after a period of
time determined by an exponential distribution with parameter
λ = 1ti . The time for next reboot is again drawn according to
the same distribution. This method produces churn with statis-
tics matching the empirical ones. We repeat each measurement
at least 5 times and report the median value found.
Bitcoin quickly recovers from a partition attack, yet it
takes hours for the network to be densely connected
again We measured how long it takes for the partition to heal
by measuring how many connections cross it, before, during
and after its formation (Fig. 8). We consider two different
attack scenarios: (i) the adversary does not intercept any
bitcoin traffic before or after the attack; and (ii) the adversary
intercepts some connections naturally.
Case 1: The adversary intercepts no traffic after the attack.
It takes 2 hours until one fifth of the initial number of
connections crossing the partition are established, while after
10 hours only half of the connections have been re-established.
The slow recovery is due to the fact that nodes on both sides
do not actively change their connections unless they or their
neighbors disconnect.
Case 2: The adversary intercepts some traffic after the
attack. If an AS-level adversary is naturally on-path for some
of the connections, she can significantly prolong the partition’s
lifetime. To do so, the attacker would just continue to drop
packets on connections she naturally intercepts. We measured
the effect of such attacks for attackers that are on-path for 14%,
18%, and 28% of the connections, respectively (Fig. 8). We
see that an AS-adversary who is initially on-path for 28% of
the connections can prolong the already slow recovery of the
partition by 58%. Many other ways to increase the persistence
of a partition exist. Due to space constraints, we discuss some
of them in Appendix D.
Despite the long healing time, the orphan rate of the network
returned to normal even with 1% of all connections crossing
the partition. This fact shows that partitions need to be perfect
in order to affect the network significantly.
VIII. DELAYING BLOCK PROPAGATION: EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the impact and practicality of
delay attacks through a set of experiments both at the node-
level and at the network-wide level. We start by demonstrating
that delay attacks against a single node work in practice
by implementing a working prototype of an interception
software that we then use to delay our own Bitcoin nodes
(Section VIII-A). We then evaluate the impact of network-
wide delay attacks by implementing a scalable event-driven
Bitcoin simulator. In constrast to partitioning attacks, and to
targeted delay attacks, we show that Bitcoin is well-protected
against network-wide delay attacks, even when considering
large coalitions of ASes as attackers (Section VIII-B).
A. How severely can an attacker delay a single node?
Methodology We implemented a prototype of our interception
software on top of Scapy [12], a Python-based packet ma-
nipulation library. Our prototype follows the methodology of
Section V and is efficient both in terms of state maintained and
processing time. Our implementation indeed maintains only
32B of memory (hash size) for each peer of the victim node.
Regarding processing time, our implementation leverages pre-
recompiled regular expressions to efficiently identify critical
packets (such as those with BLOCK messages) which are
then processed in parallel by dedicated threads. Observe that
the primitives required for the interception software are also
supported by recent programmable data-planes [19] opening
up the possibility of performing the attack entirely on network
devices.
We used our prototype to attack one of our own Bitcoin
nodes (v/Satoshi:0.12.0/, running on Ubuntu 14.04). The pro-
totype ran on a machine acting as a gateway to the victim node.
Using this setup, we measured the effectiveness of an attacker
in delaying the delivery of blocks, by varying the percentage
of connections she intercepted. To that end, we measured the
fraction of time during which the victim was uninformed of
the most recently mined block. We considered our victim node
to be uninformed when its view of the main chain is shorter
than that of a reference node. The reference node was another
Bitcoin client running the same software and the same number
of peers as the victim, but without any attacker.
% intercepted connections 50% 80% 100%
% time victim node is uniformed 63.21% 81.38% 85.45%
% total vulnerable Bitcoin nodes 67.9% 38.9% 21.7%
TABLE II: 67.9% of Bitcoin nodes are vulnerable to an
interception of 50% of their connections by an AS other than
their direct provider. Such interception can cause the node to
lag behind a reference node 63.21% of the time.
Delay attackers intercepting 50% of a node’s connection
can waste 63% of its mining power Table II illustrates
the percentage of the victim’s uptime, during which it was
uniformed of the last mined block, considering that the attacker
intercepts 100%, 80%, and 50% of its connections. Each value
is the average over an attack period of ∼200 hours. To further
evaluate the practicality of the attack, the table also depicts the
fraction of Bitcoin nodes for which there is an AS, in addition
to their direct provider, that intercepts 100%, 80%, and 50%
of its connections.
Our results reflect the major strength of the attack, which
is its effectiveness even when the adversary intercepts only
a fraction of the victim’s connections. Particularly, we see
that an attacker can waste 63% of a node’s mining power by
intercepting half of its connections. Observe that, even when
the attacker is intercepting all of the victim’s connections, the
victim eventually gets each block after a delay of 20 minutes.
Regarding the amount of vulnerable nodes to this attack in
the Bitcoin topology, we found that, for 67.9% of the nodes,
there is at least one AS other than their provider that intercepts
more than 50% of their connections. For 21.7% of the nodes
there is in fact an AS (other than their provider) that intercepts
all their connections to other nodes. In short, 21.7% of the
nodes can be isolated by an AS that is not even their provider.
B. Can powerful attackers delay the entire Bitcoin network?
Having shown that delay attacks against a single node
are practical, we now quantify the network-wide effects of
delaying block propagation.
Unlike partitioning attacks, we show that network-wide de-
lay attacks (that do not utilize active hijacking) are unlikely to
happen in practice. Indeed, only extremely powerful attackers
such as a coalition grouping all ASes based in the US could
significantly delay the Bitcoin network as a whole, increasing
the orphan rate to more than 30% from the normal 1%. We
also investigate how this effect changes as a function of the
degree of multi-homing that pools adopt.
Methodology Unlike partition attacks, the impact of delay
attacks on the network is difficult to ascertain. One would
need to actually slow down the network to fully evaluate
the cascading effect of delaying blocks. We therefore built a
realistic event-driven simulator following the principles in [39]
and used it to evaluate such effects.
Our simulator models the entire Bitcoin network and the
impact of a delay attack considering the worst-case scenario
Coalition Realistic topology Multihoming degree of pools
(Section VI) 1 3 5 7
US 23.78 38.46 18.18 6.29 4.20
DE 4.20 18.88 2.10 1.40 1.40
CN 4.90 34.27 1.40 0.70 0.70
TABLE III: Orphan rate (%) achieved by different network-
wide level delay attacks performed by coalitions of all the
ASes in a country, and considering either the topology inferred
in Section VI or synthetic topologies with various degrees of
pool multi-homing. The normal orphan rate is ∼1%.
for the attacker. Specifically, it assumes that the communica-
tion between gateways of the same pool cannot be intercepted.
Also, pools act as relay networks in that they propagate all
blocks that they receive via all their gateways. Moreover, the
simulator assumes that the delay attacker is only effective if
she intercepts the traffic from a node that receives a block
(essentially if she is able to perform the attack depicted in
Fig. 4a). We provide further details on our simulator and how
we evaluated it in Appendix A.
We ran our simulator on realistic topologies as well as on
synthetic ones with higher or lower degrees of multi-homing.
The realistic topology was inferred as described in Section VI.
The synthetic ones were created by adding more gateways to
the pools in the realistic topology until all pools reached the
predefined degree of multi-homing.
Due to pools multi-homing, Bitcoin (as a whole) is not
vulnerable to delay attackers, even powerful ones Our
results are summarized in Table III. We see that multi-homed
pools considerably increase the robustness of the Bitcoin
network against delay attacks. In essence, multi-homed pools
act as protected relays for the whole network. Indeed, multi-
homed pools have better chances of learning about blocks via
at least one gateway and can also more efficiently propagate
them to the rest of the network via the same gateways.
If we consider the current level of multi-homing, only
powerful attackers such as a coalition containing all US-based
ASes could effectively disrupt the network by increasing the
fork rate to 23% (as comparison, the baseline fork rate is 1%).
In contrast, other powerful attackers such as all China-based
or all Germany-based ASes can only increase the fork rate to
5%. As such coalitions are unlikely to form in practice, we
conclude that network-wide delay attacks do not constitute a
threat for Bitcoin.
Even a small degree of multi-homing is enough to protect
Bitcoin from powerful attackers. If all mining pools were
single-homed, large coalitions could substantially harm the
currency. The US for instance, could increase the fork rate
to 38% while China and Germany could increase it to 34%
and 18% respectively. Yet, the fork rate drops dramatically
as the average multi-homing degree increases. This is a good
news for mining pools as it shows that even a small increase
in their connectivity helps tremendously in protecting them
against delay attacks.
IX. COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we present a set of countermeasures against
routing attacks. We start by presenting measures that do not
require any protocol change and can be partially deployed
in such a way that early adopters can benefit from higher
protection (Section IX-A). We then describe longer-term sug-
gestions for both detecting and preventing routing attacks
(Section IX-B).
A. Short-term measures
Increase the diversity of node connections The more con-
nected an AS is, the harder it is to attack it. We therefore
encourage Bitcoin node owners to ensure they are multi-
homed. Observe that even single-homed Bitcoin nodes could
benefit from extra connectivity by using one or more VPN
services through encrypted tunnels so that Bitcoin traffic to
and from the node go through multiple and distinct ASes.
Attackers that wish to deny connectivity through the tunnel
would need to either know both associated IP addresses or,
alternatively, disrupt all encrypted traffic to and from nodes—
making the attack highly noticeable.
Select Bitcoin peers while taking routing into account
Bitcoin nodes randomly establish 8 outgoing connections.
While randomness is important to avoid biased decisions,
Bitcoin nodes should establish a few extra connections taking
routing into consideration. For this, nodes could either issue a
traceroute to each of their peers and analyze how often
the same AS appears in the path or, alternatively, tap into the
BGP feed of their network and select their peers based on the
AS-PATH. In both cases, if the same AS appears in all paths,
extra random connections should be established.
Monitor round-trip time (RTT) The RTT towards hijacked
destinations increases during the attack. By monitoring the
RTT towards its peers, a node could detect sudden changes and
establish extra random connections as a protection mechanism.
Monitor additional statistics Nodes should deploy anomaly
detection mechanisms to recognize sudden changes in: the
distribution of connections, the time elapsed between a request
and the corresponding answer, the simultaneous disconnec-
tions of peers, and other lower-level connection anomalies.
Again, anomalies should spur the establishment of extra ran-
dom connections.
Embrace churn Nodes should allow the natural churn of the
network to refresh their connections. A node with disabled
incoming connections or even one that is behind a NAT or
a firewall will never receive a random incoming connection
from the rest of the network. If the node is hijacked for a few
minutes and isolated from a part of the network, it will only
reconnect to the other part upon reboot or when one of its
outgoing connections fails.
Use gateways in different ASes While inferring the topology
we noticed that many pools were using gateways in the same
AS. Hosting these gateways in different ASes would make
them even more robust to routing attacks.
Prefer peers hosted in the same AS and in /24 prefixes As
the traffic of nodes hosted in /24 prefixes can only partially
be diverted (Section II). Hosting all nodes in such prefixes
would prevent partition attacks at the cost of (∼1%) increase
of the total number of Internet prefixes. Alternatively, nodes
could connect to a peer hosted in a /24 prefix which belongs
to their provider. By doing so they maintain a stealth (intra-
AS) connection with a node that is at least partially protected
against hijack.
B. Longer-term measures
Encrypt Bitcoin Communication and/or adopt MAC While
encrypting Bitcoin connections would not prevent adversaries
from dropping packets, it would prevent them from eavesdrop-
ping connections and modifying key messages. Alternatively,
using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to validate that
the content of each message has not been changed would make
delay attacks much more difficult.
Use distinct control and data channels A key problem of
Bitcoin is that its traffic is easily identifiable by filtering on
the default port (8333). Assuming encrypted connections, the
two ends could negotiate a set of random TCP ports upon
connecting to each other using the well-known port and use
them to establish the actual TCP connection, on which they
will exchange Bitcoin data. This would force the AS-level
adversary to look at all the traffic, which would be too costly.
A simpler (but poorer) solution would be for Bitcoin clients
to use randomized TCP port (encoded in clear with the ADDR
message) as it will force the AS-level adversary to maintain
state to keep track of these ports. Although a node can already
run on a non-default port, such a node will receive fewer
incoming connections (if any) as the default client strongly
prefers peers that run on the default port.
Use UDP heartbeats A TCP connection between two Bitcoin
nodes may take different forward and backward paths due to
asymmetric routing, making AS-level adversaries more power-
ful (as they only need to see one direction, see Section V). In
addition to TCP connections, Bitcoin clients could periodically
send UDP messages with corroborating data (e.g., with several
recent block headers). These UDP messages can be used as a
heartbeat that will allow nodes to discover that their connection
was partially intercepted. As UDP messages do not rely on
return traffic, this would enable node to realize that they are
out-of-sync and establish new connections.
Request a block on multiple connections Bitcoin clients
could ask multiple peers for pieces of the block. This measure
would prevent misbehaving nodes from deliberately delaying
the delivery of a block, simply because in such a case the
client will only miss one fraction of the block, which it can
request from one of its other peers.
X. RELATED WORK
AS-level adversaries The concept of AS-level adversaries has
been studied before in the context of Tor [25], [37], [22],
[50], [53]. These works also illustrated the problems caused
by centralization and routing attacks on a distributed system
running atop the Internet. Yet, Tor and Bitcoin differ vastly in
their behavior with one routing messages in an Onion-like
fashion, while the other uses random connections to flood
messages throughout the entire network. Although random
graphs are usually robust to attacks, this paper shows that it
is not the case when the network is centralized at the routing-
level.
Bitcoin attacks The security of Bitcoin from network-based
attacks has been relatively less explored compared to other
attack scenarios. While eclipsing attacks [31], [27] have a
similar impact than delay attacks when performed against a
single node, they disrupt the victim’s connections and assume
that the attacker is directly connected to the victim (Section V).
For more information about Bitcoin attacks, we refer the reader
to a recent comprehensive survey on the Bitcoin protocol [18].
BGP security issues Measuring and detecting routing at-
tacks has seen extensive research, both considering BGP
hijacks [48], [54], [55] and interception attacks [16]. Similarly,
there has been much work on proposing secure routing proto-
cols that can prevent the above attacks [17], [29], [32], [40].
In contrast, our work is the first one to show the consequences
of these attacks on cryptocurrencies.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented the first analysis of the vulnerabilities
of the Bitcoin system from a networking viewpoint. Based on
real-world data, we showed that Bitcoin is heavily centralized.
Leveraging this fact, we then demonstrated and quantified
the disruptive impact that AS-level adversaries can have on
the currency. We showed that attackers can partition the
Bitcoin network by hijacking less than 100 prefixes. We also
showed how AS-level adversaries can significantly delay the
propagation of blocks while remaining undetected. Although
these attacks are worrying, we also explained how to counter
them with both short-term and long-term measures, some of
which are easily deployable today.
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APPENDIX
A. Bitcoin event-driven simulation
In this section, we provide more details on the simulator we
used in Section VIII-B.
Inputs The simulator takes as input a realistic topology and
some synthetic topologies with higher or lower degree of
multi-homing. Each of the topologies includes the list of IP
addresses running Bitcoin nodes, the IPs of the gateways and
the hash rate associated with each mining pool, along with the
forwarding paths among all pairs of IPs. The realistic topology
was inferred as described in Section VI. The synthetic ones
were created by adding more gateways to the pools in the
realistic topology until they all reached the predefined degree
of multi-homing.
Model The simulator models each Bitcoin node as an inde-
pendent thread which reacts to events according to the Bitcoin
protocol. Whenever a node communicates with another, the
simulator adds a delay which is proportional to the number of
ASes present on the forwarding path between the two nodes.
Each nodes initializes 8 connections following the default
client implementation. Blocks are generated at intervals drawn
from an exponential distribution, with an expected rate of one
block every 10 minutes. The probability that a specific pool
succeeds in mining a block directly depends on its mining
power. We consider that the gateways of a pool form a clique
and communicate with each other with links of zero delay
which an attacker cannot intercept. Concretely, this means that
whenever a block is produced by a pool, it is simultaneously
propagated from all the gateways of this pool. Although this
choice makes the attacker less effective, we assume that this
is the default behavior of a benign pool.
Attack In the simulation, an AS can effectively delay the
delivery of a block between two nodes if and only if she
intercepts the traffic from the potential recipient to the sender,
essentially if she is able to perform the attack depicted in
Fig. 4a. An adversary that intercepts the opposite direction
is considered unable to delay blocks, during the simulation.
Although this choice makes the attacker less effective, it avoids
a dependency between the orphan rate and time. Indeed, these
attackers lose their power through time, as the connections
they intercept are dropped after the first effective block delay,
and possibly replaced with connections that are not intercepted
by the attacker.
Validation We verified our simulator by comparing the orphan
rate as well as the median propagation delay computed with
those of the real network. We found that both of them are
within the limits of the actual Bitcoin network [20].
Methodology We evaluated the impact of delay attacks con-
sidering the three most powerful country-based coalition (US,
China and Germany) as measured by the percentage of traffic
all their ASes3 see.
3We map an AS to a country based on the country it is registered in.
Isolated
mining power
Minimum
# prefixes
Median
# prefixes
# Feasible
Partitions
6% 2 86 20
7% 7 72 23
8% 32 69 14
30% 83 83 1
39% 32 51 11
40% 37 80 8
41% 44 55 3
45% 34 41 5
46% 78 78 1
47% 39 39 1
TABLE IV: This table lists all partitions that can be created
based on our inferred topology. The leftmost column indicates
the portion of mining power contained within the isolated set
and the rightmost the number of different combinations of
pools that could form it.
We run the simulation 20 times for each set of parameters
and consider a new random Bitcoin topology during each
run. In each run, 144 blocks are created, which is equivalent
to a day’s worth of block production (assuming an average
creation rate of one block per 10 minutes). We evaluated the
impact of delay attacks by measuring the orphan rate, different
adversaries can cause.
B. Possible Partitions
Table IV shows a complete list of all the possible sets
of nodes P with the mining power that can be isolated. A
summary of it was included and discussed in Section VII.
C. Inferring pool gateways
We summarize here two ways hijacking can be used to
reveal the gateways of pools.
1) The attacker may hijack the pool’s stratum servers to
discover connections that they establish and thus reveal
the gateways they connect to. Connections between the
pool’s stratum server and its gateways are done via
bitcoind’s RPC access, and can be easily distinguished.
2) The attacker may hijack the relay network to discover
the connections used by large mining pools. The relay
network has indeed a public set of six IPs that pools
connect to. By hijacking these, one may learn the IPs
of various gateways. Specifically, it will not be hard to
identify a pool by observing the blocks each publishes to
the relay network.
D. Increase partition persistence
Our observations in Section VII-D reveal concrete ways for
the attacker to make her partition lasts longer. Intuitively, the
attacker needs to suppress the effect of churn in order to keep
the victim nodes isolated. The following three observations
help in this regard:
Observation 1: A smaller set of nodes will be easier to
isolate for extended periods. The smaller the set of nodes is,
the more time will pass before any isolated node restarts.
Similarly, if the set of nodes is small, external nodes will
connect to the isolated set with lower probability.
Observation 2: All incoming connection slots can be oc-
cupied by connections from attacker nodes. Bitcoin nodes
typically limit the number of incoming connections they
accept. The attacker may use several nodes to aggressively
connect to the isolated nodes, and maintain these connections
even after BGP routing is restored. Connections initiated by
external nodes would then be rejected by the isolated nodes
(as all slots of connections remain occupied).
Observation 3: Outgoing connections can be biased via a
traditional eclipse attack [31]. Once an isolated node reboots,
it will try to establish connections to nodes in its peer lists.
These can be biased to contain attacker nodes, other isolated
nodes, and IP addresses that do not actually lead to Bitcoin
nodes. This is done by aggressively advertising these IPs to
the victim nodes. The connections they form upon rebooting
will then be biased towards those that maintain the partition.
E. Frequently Asked Questions
Can bitcoin relays bridge the partition? While Bitcoin
relays [13] improve Bitcoin performance, they do not improve
Bitcoin security against routing attacks. Indeed, as the IPs of
the relays are publicly available, relays are also vulnerable to
both hijacking and passive attacks. As such, they can neither
bridge the partition, nor act as a protected relay when an
actual network attack takes place. Note that routing attacks
are completely different from DDoS attacks, which relays are
most likely protected against. Routing attacks are much more
complicated to deal with as they constitute a human-driven
process depending highly on the provider of the victim rather
than the victim itself. As an illustration, the mitigation of a
hijack could include the provider of the attacker disconnecting
her or her announcements being filtered globally, after the
hijack has been detected by the provider of the victim.
Can NATed nodes bridge a partition? All nodes behind a
NAT act as a simple node that doesn’t accept connections.
Indeed, by hijacking the corresponding public IP, the attacker
receives traffic destined to all of them. In Section IV, we
explained why simple nodes cannot bridge the partition, the
same applies for NATed nodes.
Can Bitcoin routing alternatives solve the attacks presented
in this paper? Similar to the Bitcoin relays, existing proposals
could indeed speed up the transmission of blocks by tackling
with natural limitation of the current Internet such as delay
and packet loss. For instance, FIBRE [8] uses Forward Error
Correction (FEC) and compression to speed up the block
transmission. In parallel, Falcon [7], uses a technique called
cut-through routing to achieve fast block transmission in the
presence of increased network delays. However, neither of the
aforementioned approaches address routing attacks in the form
of BGP hijacks or traffic eavesdropping.
F. Ethical considerations
Although we performed both of the attacks we describe
against nodes that were connected to the Bitcoin network
we did not disturb their normal operations. Regarding the
hijack experiment, we advertised and hijacked a prefix that was
assigned to us by the Transit Portal (TP) project [46]. No other
traffic was influenced by our announcements. Also, the isolated
nodes were experimental nodes we ran ourselves. Actual
Bitcoin nodes that happened to be connected to these were
not affected, they just had one of their connections occupied
(as if they were connected to a supernode). Regarding the
delay experiment, the victims were again our own Bitcoin
clients. While they were indeed connected to nodes in the real
network, those were not affected as we only modified packets
towards our victim nodes.
